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Abstract
Increasing levels of far-right extremist violence have generated public concern about the spread of radicalization in
the United States. Previous research suggests that radicalized individuals are destabilized by various environmental (or
endemic) factors, exposed to extremist ideology, and subsequently reinforced by members of their community. As such,
the spread of radicalization may proceed through a social contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave like
complex contagions that require multiple exposures for adoption. In this study, I applied an epidemiological method
called two-component spatio-temporal intensity modeling to data from 416 far-right extremists exposed in the United
States between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that patterns of far-right radicalization in the United States are
consistent with a complex contagion process, in which reinforcement is required for transmission. Both social media
usage and group membership enhance the spread of extremist ideology, suggesting that online and physical organizing
remain primary recruitment tools of the far-right movement. Additionally, I identified several endemic factors, such
as poverty, that increase the probability of radicalization in particular regions. Future research should investigate how
specific interventions, such as online counter-narratives to battle propaganda, may be effectively implemented to mitigate
the spread of far-right extremism in the United States.
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Introduction
The far-right movement, which includes white supremacists,
neo-Nazis, and sovereign citizens, is the oldest and most
deadly form of domestic extremism in the United States [1,
2]. Despite some ideological diversity, members of the far-
right often advocate for the use of violence to bring about an
“idealized future favoring a particular group, whether this
group identity is racial, pseudo-national, or characterized
by individualistic traits” [3]. Over the last decade, the far-
right movement was responsible for 73.3% of all extremist
murders in the United States. In 2018, this statistic rose
to 98% [4]. The increasing severity of far-right extremist
violence, as well as the associated rhetoric on social media
[5, 6], has generated public concern about the spread of
radicalization in the United States. Former extremists have
referred to it as a public health issue [7, 8], an idea advocated
for by some policy experts as well [9, 10].
There is little evidence that radicalization is primarily
driven by psychopathology [11–13]. Rather, radicalization
appears to be a process in which individuals are destabi-
lized by various environmental factors, exposed to extremist
ideology, and subsequently reinforced by members of their
community [12, 14–17]. Even “lone wolves”, or solo ac-
tors, often interact with extremist communities online [11,
18, 19]. As such, radicalization may spread through a so-
cial contagion process, in which extremist ideologies behave
like complex contagions that require multiple exposures for
adoption [20], which has been observed for political move-
ments more broadly [21]. Previous research suggests that
extremist propaganda [22], hate crimes [23, 24], intergroup
conflict [25, 26], and terrorism [27–31] exhibit similar dy-
namics.
The environmental factors favoring radicalization, re-
ferred to here as endemic factors, include variables like
poverty rate that may influence individuals’ risk of adop-
tion in particular regions. As such, endemic factors have
the potential to enhance or constrain the spread of con-
tagions through populations across geographic space. Al-
though significant research has been done on how endemic
factors predict radicalization (and resulting violence) [2, 32–
35], few studies have investigated how these factors interact
with contagion processes. The aim of the current study is
to determine whether patterns of far-right radicalization in
the United States are consistent with a contagion process,
and to assess the influence of critical endemic factors. After
controlling for population density, I assessed the following
endemic factors that have been implicated in previous re-
search on radicalization, extremism, and mass shootings:
poverty rate [2, 35–42], unemployment rate [2, 33, 36, 43–
47], income inequality [32, 33, 42, 46, 48–50], education lev-
els [37, 45, 49–53], non-white population size [32, 34, 35, 53],
violent crime rate [48, 53, 54], gun ownership [40, 47, 55, 56],
hate groups per capita [57], and Republican voting [35, 52].
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Furthermore, I aim to determine whether individual-level
variables, such as social media use, enhance the spread of
far-right radicalization over space and time. Social media
platforms increasingly appear to play a role in radicaliza-
tion, both as formal recruitment tools [58–61] and spaces
for extremist communities to interact [5, 62–64]. If social
media platforms augment physical organizing [65, 66], then
they may also enhance the spread of radicalization.
Although social media platforms relax geographic con-
straints on communication, evidence suggests that social
media networks still exhibit spatial clustering. For exam-
ple, the majority of an individuals’ Facebook friends live
within 100 miles of them [67], the probability of informa-
tion diffusion on social media decays with increasing dis-
tance [68], and online echo chambers map onto particular
locations [69]. Since complex contagions require reinforce-
ment, and the majority of online friendship ties are within
a close radius, the diffusion of extremist ideologies online
should still exhibit some level of geographic bias.
In order to model the spread of far-right radicalization I
used a two-component spatio-temporal intensity (twinstim)
model [70], an epidemiological method that treats events
in space and time as resulting from self-exciting point pro-
cesses [71]. In this framework, future events depend on the
history of past events within a certain geographic range.
Event probabilities are determined by a conditional inten-
sity function, which is separated into endemic and epidemic
components. This allows researchers to assess the combined
effects of both spatio-temporal covariates and epidemic pre-
dictors. Epidemic, in this framework, refers to any level of
contagion effect and does not necessarily imply uncontrol-
lable spread. With a couple of notable exceptions [72, 73],
previous applications of self-exciting point process models
in terrorism and mass shooting research have not simulta-
neously modeled diffusion over both time and space [74–81].
The radicalization events in this study, which correspond
to where and when a radicalized individual’s extremist ac-
tivity or plot was exposed, came from the Profiles of In-
dividual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS), an
anonymized database compiled by the National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START) [3]. PIRUS is compiled from sources in the pub-
lic record, and only includes individuals radicalized in the
United States who were either arrested, indicted, or killed as
a result of ideologically-motivated crimes, or were directly
associated with a violent extremist organization. I chose to
use PIRUS instead of the Terrorism and Extremist Violence
in the United States (TEVUS) database because events in
PIRUS are disambiguated by individual and include social
variables that may influence the diffusion process.
A contagion effect in this modeling framework could re-
sult from one of two forces. The first is a copy-cat effect, in
which individuals copy behaviors observed directly or in the
media. Although this effect has been proposed in terrorism
and mass shooting research in the past [77, 82], it seems to
be a more plausible contagion mechanism for specific meth-
ods of violence [83] (e.g. suicide bombings [84]) rather than
radicalization more broadly. The second is linkage triggered
by activism and organizing, or ideologically-charged events
(e.g. elections, demonstrations, policies), in that region. To
differentiate between these two forces, I included two sets of
epidemic predictors in the modeling. The first two event-
level variables, plot success and anticipated fatalities, might
be expected to increase epidemic probability if a copy-cat ef-
fect is present. This is because successful large-scale events
are probably more contagious due to increased media cov-
erage [77]. Alternatively, the two individual-level variables,
group membership and social media use, might be expected
to increase epidemic probability if activism and organizing
drive the linkage between events.
Methods
0.1 Data Collection
All individual-level data came from PIRUS. Only individu-
als with far-right ideology who were exposed during or after
2005 (the earliest year with social media data) with location
data at the city-level or lower (n = 416; F: 6.0%, M: 94.0%)
were included (see Figures 1 and 2). For each individual,
the date and location of their exposure (usually when their
activity/plot occurred), whether their plot was successful
(34.9%), the anticipated fatalities of their plot (0: 69.5%,
1-20: 26.0%, >20: 2.6%, >100: 1.9%), whether they were a
member of a formal or informal group of extremists (58.4%),
and whether social media played a role in their radicalization
(31.2%), were included. Unknown or missing values for each
predictor (plot success: 0.5%, anticipated fatalities: 13.5%,
group membership: 0%, social media: 54.8%) were coded as
0. To ensure that the coding procedure for missing predictor
values did not introduce bias, I checked whether the results
of the full model were consistent after multiple imputation
with chained equations and random forest machine learning
(see Table S1). The location of each exposure was geocoded
from the nearest city or town using the R package ggmap
[85]. Since domestic terrorists tend to commit acts in their
local area [86–88], I assumed that exposure locations reflect
where individuals were radicalized.
State-level gun ownership was estimated using a proxy
measure based on suicide rates and hunting licenses [89].
Using data from 2001, 2002, and 2004 (the only three years
for which state-level gun ownership data is available), Seigel
et al. found that the following proxy correlates with gun
ownership with an R2 of 0.95:
(0.62 · FS
S
) + (0.88 ·HL) − 0.0448 (1)
where FS/S is the proportion of suicides that involve
firearms (from the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion1, or CDC), and HL is hunting licenses per capita (from
1https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html
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Figure 1: The number of far-right extremists exposed in the
PIRUS database, both per-year (left) and cumulative (right),
between 2005 and 2017.
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service2) [89]. Missing
suicide rates (five years for DC, two years for Rhode Is-
land) were replaced with the mean values for that state.
State-level hate group data was collected from the Southern
Poverty Law Center3, while violent crime data was collected
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime
Reporting Program4.
County-level demographic data was collected from the US
Census using the R package censusapi [90]. This included
population density, poverty rate, Gini index of income in-
equality, percentage of the population that is non-white,
percentage of the population that has at least a high-school
diploma, and unemployment rate. County-level income,
race, education, and unemployment data is only available
after 2009, so the 2010 data was used for 2005-2009. County-
level presidential election voting records were collected from
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Election Lab5,
and non-election years were assigned the data from the most
recent election year.
Geographic data was collected from the US Census using
the R package tigris [91].
0.2 Model Specification
Twinstim modeling was conducted using the R package
surveillance [70]. To convert the data to a continuous spatio-
temporal point process, all tied locations and dates were
shifted in a random direction up to half of the minimum
spatial and temporal distance between events (1.52 km and
0.5 days, respectively) [92].
2https://wsfrprograms.fws.gov/Subpages/LicenseInfo/Hunting.htm
3https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map
4https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr
5https://electionlab.mit.edu/data
Step functions were used to model both spatial and tem-
poral interactions. Visual inspection of the pair correlation
function for the point pattern indicates that the data is sig-
nificantly clustered up to 400 km (see Figure S1). As such,
the spatial step function was split into four 100 km inter-
vals with 400 km as the maximum interaction radius [93].
The temporal step function was split into four six-month
intervals up to two years (based on the the high degree of
variation in radicalization and attack planning times among
domestic extremists [94–96]). I attempted the analysis with
different combinations of power-law, Gaussian, and Student
spatial functions, and exponential temporal functions, but
these variations converged to unrealistically steep spatial
and temporal interaction functions that approached zero
around two km and two days, and appeared to be signif-
icantly influenced by the tie-breaking procedure [92].
Population density (county-level) was log-transformed
and used as an offset endemic term. A centered time
trend was also included to determine whether the strength
of the endemic component has shifted over time. Poverty
rate (county-level), Gini index of income inequality (county-
level), gun ownership (state-level), percentage of the popu-
lation that is non-white (county-level), percentage of the
population that has at least a high-school diploma (county-
level), unemployment rate (county-level), percentage of vot-
ers that vote Republican in presidential elections (county-
level), violent crime rate per thousand residents (state-
level), and number of hate groups per million residents
(state-level) were included as dynamic endemic predictors
that change annually. Plot success, anticipated fatalities,
group membership, and social media radicalization were in-
cluded as epidemic predictors.
All possible models with all possible combinations of pre-
dictors were run and ranked by Akaike’s Information Crite-
rion (AIC) [97]. The best fitting model with the lowest AIC
was used assess the effects of each variable on event proba-
bility. Rate ratios were calculated by applying exponential
transformation to the model estimates.
0.3 Permutation Test
To determine whether the spatio-temporal interaction of the
epidemic component was statistically significant, I used the
Monte Carlo permutation approach developed by Meyer et
al. [98]. Using this approach, a twinstim model with all
endemic predictors from the best fitting model and no epi-
demic predictors was compared to 1,000 permuted null mod-
els with randomly shuffled event times. For each permuta-
tion I estimated the reproduction number (R0), or the ex-
pected number of future events that an event triggers on
average, which represents “infectivity”. A p-value was cal-
culated by comparing the observed R0 with the null distri-
bution of the subset of permutations that converged.
For additional support, I also ran a likelihood ratio test
and a standard Knox test of spatio-temporal clustering. The
Knox test was conducted with spatial and temporal radii of
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Figure 2: The untied locations of far-right extremists exposed in the PIRUS database between 2005 and 2017. The color of each
county corresponds to its log-transformed population density.
100 km and six months (the upper bounds of the first steps
in the step functions), respectively [99].
0.4 Simulations
To further assess the quality of the model, I conducted simu-
lations from the cumulative intensity function using Ogata’s
modified thinning algorithm according to Meyer et al. [100].
Using the parameters of the best fitting model, I conducted
1,000 simulations of the last six months of the study period
and compared the results to the observed data.
Results
The results of the best fitting model (∆AIC < 2), which in-
cluded seven endemic and two epidemic predictor variables,
are shown in Table 1. Firstly, there is a statistically sig-
nificant time trend whereby the endemic rate decreases by
4.6% each year, indicating that the strength of the epidemic
component has increased over time. There appears to be a
baseline increase in the endemic component between 2008-
2012 which likely corresponds to the financial crisis [101], as
well as a significant spike in the epidemic component around
2016 which likely corresponds to the presidential election
[102, 103] (Figure 3). There are also significant positive ef-
fects of poverty rates (p < 0.01) and the presence of hate
groups (p < 0.0001) on radicalization probability. Inter-
estingly, the percentage of voters that vote Republican in
presidential elections (p < 0.0001), the percentage of the
population that is non-white (p < 0.05), and unemploy-
ment rates (p < 0.0001) appear to have significant negative
effects on radicalization probability. Gun ownership, edu-
cation level, and violent crime all had no significant effect
on radicalization probability. When Republican voting was
replaced with the absolute percent difference between Re-
publican and Democratic voting, a proxy measure for the
competitiveness of elections, it was no longer significant. A
variance inflation factor test identified no collinearity prob-
lems among the time-averaged endemic predictors (VIF <
3) [104].
Both group membership and radicalization via social me-
dia have strong and significant positive effects on epidemic
probability. Exposures of individuals who belong to formal
or informal extremist groups are over four times more likely
to be followed by future exposures in close spatial or tempo-
ral proximity (p < 0.01). Similarly, exposures of individuals
radicalized on social media are almost three times as likely
to be followed by future exposures (p < 0.01). Anticipated
4
Figure 3: The total intensity (in black), as well as the isolated
endemic component (grey), over time. Total intensity can be
interpreted as the proportion of radicalization probability that is
explained by the endemic and epidemic components.
fatalities and plot success did not appear in the best fit-
ting model. Estimates of the decaying spatial and temporal
interaction functions, as well as model diagnostics, can be
seen in Figures S2 and S3, respectively. A variance infla-
tion factor test identified no collinearity problems among
the epidemic predictors (VIF < 3) [104].
Based on the permutation test, the observed R0 (0.31)
is significantly higher than the null distribution of the con-
verged permutations (Nconv = 739, p < 0.01) (Figure 4).
This indicates that the spatio-temporal interaction in the
epidemic model is significant. Both the likelihood ratio test
of the epidemic against the endemic model (p < 0.0001) and
RR 95% CI p-value
Time trend 0.946 0.91–0.98 0.0015
Poverty 1.052 1.02–1.09 0.0025
Unemployment 0.871 0.82–0.93 <0.0001
Republican voting 0.969 0.96–0.98 <0.0001
Non-white population 0.989 0.98–1.00 0.038
Education level 0.980 0.96–1.00 0.075
Hate groups 1.191 1.12–1.27 <0.0001
Violent crime 0.930 0.84–1.03 0.17
Group membership 4.563 1.57–13.28 0.0054
Social media 2.722 1.55–4.76 0.0005
Table 1: The results of the twinstim modeling, with estimated
rate ratios (RR), Wald confidence intervals, and p-values. En-
demic predictors (including the overall time trend) are in the
top portion of the table, whereas epidemic predictors are in the
bottom.
Figure 4: The results of the Monte Carlo permutation test. The
grey bars show the null distribution of R0 from the 739 permu-
tations that converged, whereas the red dashed line shows the
observed R0 (0.31) calculated from the twinstim model.
the Knox test (p < 0.0001) support this result.
The results of the simulations can be seen in Figures 5
and 6. On average the simulations neatly match the ob-
served cumulative number of exposures between June, 2017
and January, 2018 (Figure 5), indicating that the model ac-
curately captures the temporal dynamics in the data. Sim-
ilarly, the model appears to do a good job of capturing the
spatial dynamics in the data, although it is clearly weighted
towards high population density areas (Figure 6).
Discussion
By applying novel epidemiological methods to data on 416
extremists exposed between 2005 and 2017, this study pro-
vides evidence that patterns of far-right radicalization in
the United States are consistent with a contagion process.
Firstly, the estimated reproduction number is significantly
higher than those from simulated null models, indicating
that endemic causes alone are not sufficient to explain the
spatio-temporal clustering observed in the data. The repro-
duction number for radicalization (R0 = 0.31) is also lower
than one, suggesting that extremist ideologies behave like
complex contagions that require reinforcement for transmis-
sion. Fortunately, this means that extremist ideologies are
unlikely to spread uncontrollably through populations like
seasonal influenza (R0 = 1.28) [105], but outbreaks can oc-
cur under the right endemic and epidemic conditions. For
example, regions with higher rates of poverty and hate group
activity are more likely to experience far-right extremism,
whereas regions with a larger non-white population, more
5
Figure 5: The cumulative number of exposures during the last
six months of the study period (red), as well as the results of
1,000 simulations (grey).
Republican voting, and higher rates of unemployment are
less likely to experience far-right extremism. Most impor-
tantly, radicalizations involving extremist groups or social
media significantly increase the epidemic probability of fu-
ture radicalizations in the same location. This suggests that
clusters of radicalizations in space and time are driven by
activism and organizing rather than a copy-cat effect.
The fact that group membership significantly increases
the epidemic strength of events, and the presence of hate
groups significantly increases radicalization probability, sug-
gests that local organizing remains a potent recruitment
tool of the far-right movement. This idea is reflected in
recent increases in rallies across the country, such as “Unite
the Right” in Charlottesville, VA in August of 2017, that
have been attended by regional chapters of white nation-
alist and militia organizations. It also suggests that con-
cerns about typological “lone wolves” radicalized over social
media should not overshadow the persistent and expanding
far-right movement in the United States. Only 10.8% of
people in this study were radicalized on social media inde-
pendently of an extremist group, indicating that solo actors
are still the minority in the far-right movement. That be-
ing said, solo actors radicalized on social media, such as
Omar Mateen (Pulse nightclub shooting in 2016) and Dy-
lann Roof (Charleston church shooting in 2015) [19], are
typically deadlier than group members in the United States
[106], and should thus be the subject of much future re-
search.
Radicalization on social media also significantly increases
the epidemic strength of events, indicating that social media
platforms augment physical organizing and that the diffu-
sion of extremist ideologies online is likely geographically bi-
Figure 6: The exposure locations during the last six months of
the study period. The color gradient, ranging from blue (low) to
yellow (high), represents a Gaussian kernel density for the results
of 1,000 simulations with a bandwidth of 200 km. The contour
lines segment the kernel density into 10 levels.
ased. The increasing role of social media in far-right extrem-
ism and radicalization is well established [5, 19, 107–109].
Social media platforms like Twitter provide extremist com-
munities with low cost access to large audiences that might
not otherwise engage with far-right content [58, 59]. For ex-
ample, one report found that only 44% of people who follow
high-profile white nationalists on Twitter overtly express
similar ideologies [110]. As mainstream platforms clamp
down on hate speech, extremist users have just shifted their
traffic to alternative sites such as 8chan and Gab [111, 112].
Given the centrality of social media in far-right organizing,
future research should explore how counter-narratives [113,
114] and other strategies could be used to fight the spread
of extremist ideology online.
The results indicate that county-level poverty rates in-
crease the probability of far-right radicalization. While
there is little to no evidence that poverty predicts extrem-
ism at the state-level [2, 36, 37, 40], studies at the county-
level have found that poverty predicts both mass shooting
rate [42] and hate groups (presence [35] not longevity [38,
39, 41]). This discrepancy between geographic resolutions
indicates that using state-level poverty data obscures local
variation. The results of this study also reveal a negative
effect of unemployment rate on radicalization, adding to the
remarkably contradictory evidence for links between unem-
ployment and extremism in the United States [2, 33, 36, 43–
46]. Although this result appears to be counter-intuitive, I
hypothesize that poverty and unemployment may interact
in driving radicalization. For example, individuals from re-
gions where jobs are plentiful but poverty remains high may
be the most disillusioned and susceptible to extremist ide-
ologies. Interestingly, income inequality did not appear in
the best fitting model, and had no significant effect when in-
cluded. This suggests that overall deprivation, as measured
by poverty rates, is more important in driving radicalization
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than inequality. Previous studies that have found a positive
impact of income inequality on hate groups or crimes ei-
ther used state-level data [46], did not account for poverty
rate [32, 33], or combined it with poverty rate into a sin-
gle index [48]. Interestingly, both unemployment [47] and
income inequality [42, 49, 50] appear to be strong predic-
tors of mass shootings. Although this seems paradoxical,
the majority of mass shootings are not ideologically driven
[115], so the socioeconomic drivers may be different than for
far-right radicalization.
Violent crime appears to have no influence on radicaliza-
tion. Although one study of the Klu Klux Klan found that
high levels of far-right activity can increase homicide rates in
the long-term [48], there is little evidence for violent crime
rates driving increases in extremist violence or radicaliza-
tion [54]. Hate crime is only very weakly correlated with
violent crime [53], and extremist violence is even more rare
[116], so they are likely driven by different factors.
Previous studies have found strong evidence for a neg-
ative relationship between education and hate crime rates
[45, 53], a positive relationship between education and mass
shooting rates [49, 50], and no evidence for a relationship
between education and hate group organizing [37, 51, 52].
The results of this study are consistent with the latter cate-
gory, which makes sense given that the majority of the plots
in the dataset were non-violent.
The negative effect of Republican voting on event prob-
ability could be because individuals on the far-right of the
political spectrum who live in counties with more Demo-
cratic voters may feel more partisan hostility [117]. Inter-
estingly, this effect does not appear to be the result of more
competitive elections [38], as the absolute difference between
Republican and Democratic voting did not significantly in-
fluence event probability. Alternatively, the negative effect
of Republican voting may be due to the fact that many of
the rural counties that lean heavily Republican have low
population densities and no recent history of extremist vi-
olence. A previous study that found mixed evidence for a
positive influence of Republican voting on the presence of
hate groups excluded counties without hate groups from the
modeling, which may have eliminated this skew effect [35].
The fact that the percentage of the population that is non-
white negatively predicts far-right extremist violence is con-
sistent with the intergroup contact hypothesis, which sug-
gests that prolonged contact between racial groups reduces
conflict under certain conditions [118]. Although other re-
searchers have suggested that population heterogeneity in-
creases far-right radicalization [32], the only study to find
evidence of this in the United States did not explicitly ac-
count for population density [34]. Other studies controlling
for population density have found that both anti-black hate
crimes and hate groups appear to be more common in white
dominated, racially homogeneous areas [35, 53]. Despite
mixed evidence for the intergroup contact hypothesis, it is
widely accepted that community diversity and tolerance is
key to fighting radicalization and extremist violence globally
[119–124].
Gun ownership does not predict radicalization in this
model, which is unsurprising since only 30.5% of people in
this study planned on committing fatal attacks but inter-
esting given the centrality of gun control in debates follow-
ing mass shootings in the United States [125–127]. Despite
strong evidence that gun ownership is linked to mass shoot-
ing rates at the national-level [56], evidence for same pat-
tern at the state-level remains mixed. Previous studies have
found that it either positively predicts mass shootings over-
all [56], when combined with particular gun control laws
[55], or not at all [40, 47]. Unfortunately CDC funding
for research on gun ownership was restricted by Congress in
1996 after lobbying by the National Rifle Association, so po-
tential links between extremist violence and gun ownership
remain understudied [128–131].
Several limitations of this study should be highlighted.
Firstly, the PIRUS database only represents a subset of rad-
icalized individuals in the United States. The creators of the
database used random sampling to maximize its represen-
tativeness over different time periods, but there remains a
possibility of spatial or temporal bias in the original data
due to factors like law enforcement effort. In addition, the
geographic locations of events are only geocoded to the city-
level, potentially enhancing the spatial clustering of the
data. Furthermore, social media data were missing for a
significant number of individuals (54.8%). The significance
level of the estimate for social media usage is extremely low
and robust to imputation, indicating that it likely reflects
a real effect, but researchers should exercise caution when
interpreting this result [132]. Lastly, the spatial resolution
of three of the endemic predictors was limited to the state-
level, which may have flattened some important local varia-
tion. One of these variables, gun ownership, was also a proxy
measure. Policymakers should release historical restrictions
on research funding for gun violence and hate crime research
to improve data resolution for future studies.
In conclusion, far-right radicalization in the United States
appears to spread through populations like a complex con-
tagion. Both social media usage and group membership
enhance the contagion process, indicating that online and
physical organizing remain primary recruitment tools of the
far-right movement. In addition, far-right radicalization
is more likely in Democratic-majority regions with high
poverty and low unemployment, fewer non-white people,
and more hate group activity. While the federal govern-
ment has acknowledged the threat of far-right extremism
[133], funding for organizations researching or fighting the
movement has decreased in recent years [134]. Based on
the results of this study, I recommend that policymakers
reconsider their funding priorities to address the expanding
far-right extremist movement in the United States. Future
research should investigate how specific interventions, such
as online counter-narratives to battle propaganda, may be
effectively implemented to mitigate the spread of extremist
ideology.
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Data & Code Availability Statement
All data used in the study are available online either publicly
or upon request (PIRUS). The R scripts used in the study
will be made available upon peer-reviewed publication.
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Supporting information
0.1 Imputation Check
To ensure that the coding procedure did not bias the estimation of the epidemic predictors, the full twinstim model
was re-run after multiple imputation with chained equations using the R package mice [1] and random forest machine
learning using the R package missForest [2]. All four epidemic predictors (plot success, anticipated fatalities, and group
membership) were used in fitting and training. The maximum iterations was set to 10 and number of trees was set to
100. The results of 100 rounds of both imputation methods can be seen in Table S1.
Chained equations Random forest
RR p-value RR p-value
Group membership 5.014 0.0040 6.61 0.00040
Social media 2.29 0.065 4.092 0.00013
Anticipated fatalities 1.15 0.43 0.90 0.53
Plot success 0.93 0.78 1.11 0.55
Table S1: The average rate ratios and p-values for all epidemic predictors after 100 rounds of imputation and estimation using the
full model.
Since the observed estimate of social media, the only epidemic predictor with missing data in the best fitting model, is
between those from the two imputation methods, and as random forest in missForest outcompetes chained equations in
mice in most [2–7] (but not all [8, 9]) direct comparisons, I assume that the coding method did not significantly influence
the results. I assumed that data were missing at random, although missing social
0.2 Spatial interaction
Figure S1: The pair correlation function at different pairwise distances in km (x -axis). The black line is the observed function for
the data, the red line is the theoretical function assuming spatial randomness, and the grey envelope shows the upper and lower
bounds of the functions from 100 simulated point patterns demonstrating spatial randomness.
0.3 Diagnostics
The residuals, or the fitted cumulative intensities over time, were calculated and transformed to fit a uniform distribution
according to Ogata [10]. The cumulative density function diverges from expectations for Ui < 0.58, which appears to
be the result of tie-breaking with small temporal distances (0.5 days) [11]. Increasing the tie-breaking distance to > 20
days to improve the cumulative density function and reduce serial correlation did not significantly change the predictor
estimates, so I chose to use the original model.
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Figure S2: Estimates of the scaled spatial (left panel) and temporal (right) step functions. The 95% Monte Carlo confidence
intervals were each calculated from 100 samples.
Figure S3: (A) The empirical cumulative density function of Ui, or the standardized residuals according to Ogata [10], with 95%
Kolmogorov-Smirnov confidence bands. (B) A scatterplot of Ui and Ui+1 to look for serial correlation.
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